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The Ebola Outbreak in Comparison: 
Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire 
Katharina Heitz Tokpa, Andrea Kaufmann and Franzisca Zanker
West Africa has been fighting its first epidemic of the Ebola virus disease for more than 
a year now. Despite a decline of infections, especially in urban centres, new cases still 
emerge and call for continued vigilance. According to the WHO, there have been 26,044 
cases with 10,808 mortalities as of April 22, 2015. Though Sierra Leone has by now 
experienced the highest number of cases, overall mortality rates are higher in Liberia, 
where almost half of those infected died (4,573 of 10,212). No case has been recorded in 
Côte d’Ivoire. Why has there not been a single official case in Côte d’Ivoire despite the 
fact that it shares large parts of its border with Liberia and Guinea?
Analysis
  Apart from the slow reactions from international organizations, with some nota-
ble exceptions, there are a number of domestic reasons why measures against the 
spread of Ebola took a long time to take effect. This includes weak state institutions 
and a lack of trust. In those countries in which Ebola spread most rapidly, public in-
frastructure is in much worse condition than in countries where the disease could 
be contained, or where there have been no cases so far like in Côte d’Ivoire.
  The high number of international organizations present in Liberia has contributed 
to uncoordinated and partial reconstruction efforts. Emphasis has been on the Se-
curity Sector Reform - at the expense of the health system and other public services.
  A long history of negative experiences with the Liberian state, coupled with two 
civil wars has deepened citizens’ mistrust towards state actors and institutions. 
  Côte d’Ivoire has a comparatively good infrastructure with a better-equipped health 
care sector. 
  A solid communications infrastructure in Côte d’Ivoire, which was extended dur-
ing the peace process, has allowed the state to mobilize and alert large parts of the 
population early on.
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Complexities of Post-War Liberia
In 2003, The Economist called Liberia “the worst 
place to live in the world.” In the early 1990s, Libe-
ria hit international headlines with the outbreak of 
civil war that included child soldiers, cross-dress-
ing rebels and the ominous conflict over “blood di-
amonds”, though the latter largely took place in 
neighboring Sierra Leone. More recently, the pic-
tures of a Liberia shaken by Ebola reminded of 
these years of turmoil: a state of emergency with 
overcrowded hospitals, dead bodies in the streets, 
a terrified population, or closed schools. Ma-
ny employers recommended their staff to stay at 
home, and international organizations and busi-
nesses flew out their personnel. When these busi-
nesses and organizations ceased to operate, often 
so did the payment of their local employees.
Early responses to stopping the further spread 
of Ebola seemed helpless and disorganized. How 
could this epidemic spread so fast? A more differ-
entiated view of West Africa can help us under-
stand how the Ebola virus has spread. Compar-
ing the situation in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, two 
neighboring countries, shows subtle differences 
which made the former one of the most severe-
ly affected countries and the latter not recording 
a single case. 
A great many factors are responsible for the se-
verity of the situation in Liberia, many of which 
are interlinked. Liberia’s history is marked by de-
cades of extreme inequality between a small but 
high-powered tier of society who maintained their 
expansive power and economic authority at the 
expense of a marginalized majority of the popula-
tion. Ever since 1847, when former slaves from the 
United States founded Liberia, the state has been 
marked by the centralization of power and pub-
lic goods; state-run institutions were concentrat-
ed mainly in the capital and public infrastructures 
have always been scarce. Because of this, public 
goods and services such as health care and educa-
tional facilities were largely available only to elites 
in the most important cities, particularly Monro-
via. The civil wars between 1990 and 2003 exac-
erbated this inequality, as most of the states’ in-
frastructure was practically destroyed. More than 
200,000 people died as a result of this period of vi-
olent conflict. 
The first post-war elections were held in 2005. 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a development economist 
with solid international connections and experi-
ence, won the presidential elections. The first few 
years of her period in office went well: structur-
al reforms were planned at every level of gov-
ernment, leaving many people hoping for last-
ing change. But reform efforts were only imple-
mented slowly, and in some cases they failed to 
take place at all. A variety of international organi-
zations such as the World Bank and Internation-
al Monetary Fund supported infrastructural and 
other development projects, as did a myriad of 
private and state-run development organizations. 
But little of this reconstruction work was efficient-
ly coordinated and structured. In addition, whilst 
these international organizations provided advice 
and capacity building, this reduced responsibili-
ty taken by some state institutions, impairing the 
long-term institutional development as a result. 
The considerable lack of coordination efforts is 
particularly evident in the health system. 
In 2008, Liberia ranked at the bottom of the 
number of doctors in relation to the population. 
The few doctors in the country were mainly em-
ployed in hospitals in Monrovia and a few oth-
er hospitals in regional capitals. Most clinics are 
in fact run by international organizations, and be-
came regarded as the most trustworthy. An exten-
sive public health system has never existed in Li-
beria. In 1985, before the first civil war took place, 
only 35 percent of the population had access to 
medical care; there was only one state-run hospi-
tal available for the entire country, and that was in 
Monrovia. Moreover, a large number of universi-
ty graduates left the country during the war, ma-
ny of whom were qualified doctors. A low level of 
basic medical care was therefore ensured by hu-
manitarian aid organizations. Way before the Eb-
ola crisis hit Liberia, waiting rooms in clinics were 
generally overcrowded, and medical staff was 
overwhelmed with work. In 2008, there were few-
er than sixty doctors in the entire country of four 
million inhabitants (see Table 1). 
In February 2014, nursing staff in a number 
of public health facilities went on strike. The em-
ployees wanted to raise awareness of the precari-
ous financial situation they were in and refused to 
accept any reductions of their allowances. In re-
sponse, Walter Gwenigale, the minister of health 
at the time, threatened not to pay their salaries 
for February 2014 and to lay people off. This led 
to criticism by the National Health Workers As-
sociation of Liberia (NAHWAL) and a refusal to 
work with the minister, with the strikes resuming 
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in March. At the same time, first reports circulated 
about Ebola infections. These were initially con-
firmed by the Liberian government, but then lat-
er denied. 
Liberia’s health care system had already been 
going through a crisis for some time. Unfortunate-
ly, this situation only became apparent to the rest 
of the world when the Ebola epidemic broke out. 
Other sectors were given priority up till then, in-
cluding most significantly the security sector. A 
UN peacekeeping force (UNMIL) with an initial 
deployment of 15,000 personnel played an impor-
tant role in improving security in post-war Libe-
ria. Initially focused on demobilizing and reinte-
grating Liberian combatants, the focus then shift-
ed the reform of the security sector, including re-
building the police force under the auspices of 
the UN, and the Armed Forces of Liberia under 
the direction of a private security company com-
missioned by the United States. Understandably, 
the first priority in post-war Liberia, like in sim-
ilar settings, was to stabilize the country. Never-
theless, this focus on security diverted people’s at-
tention from other issues, especially the shortcom-
ings that existed in the health and education sec-
tors. The structural problems that Liberia faces are 
particularly grave, when compared with those of 
its neighbor, Côte d’Ivoire.
Public Infrastructure in Côte d’Ivoire
Liberia shares the longest part of its border with 
its eastern neighbor, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire. 
This West African state, too, is only just recovering 
from a period of violent political conflict, which 
lasted from 2002 to 2011 and left more than 10,000 
people dead. On the whole, though, the conflict 
was less destructive than in Liberia. Therefore, 
Côte d’Ivoire has been able to build on its com-
paratively sound infrastructure it had before the 
violent conflict broke out. 
The world’s largest producer of cocoa has long 
been an economic and political exception in West 
Africa. The first president, Houphouët-Boigny, 
pursued a liberal, France-oriented policy and at-
tracted foreign capital as a result. The high price 
of natural resources in the 1960s and ‘70s ensured 
post-independence Côte d’Ivoire two golden de-
cades of economic growth, which still remains in 
many people’s minds today. Unlike the situation 
in Liberia, a middle class with considerable pur-
chasing power emerged. It was at this time of eco-
nomic success and political stability that large-
scale infrastructure projects were implemented. 
Since colonial times, state-led infrastructure 
projects - including the health sector - have priv-
ileged the plantation-rich South. For instance, in-
stead of investing money in twelve regional hos-
pitals, Houphouët’s government prioritized the 
construction of a modern university hospital in 
one of the well-off parts of Abidjan to the detri-
ment of country-wide basic health care. Thus, the 
country shares the structural problems with oth-
er countries in the region (Graber and Patel 2013). 
Moreover, the crises of the 1990s, and especial-
ly the armed conflict of 2002, put a great strain 
on the nation’s infrastructure. Nonetheless, Côte 
d’Ivoire is in a relatively good position compared 
with other countries in the region. Until the late 
1980s, wealthier classes of society have sought 
treatment at health centers for the general pub-
lic rather than at private clinics. Although public 
services have suffered from the economic decline 
in the 1990s, a fair degree of trust exists in Côte 
d’Ivoire’s health care system. 
Conditions for coping with a potential case of 
Ebola are considerably better than in neighboring 
Liberia, and this is reflected in the way the popu-
lation has responded to the health threat and sen-
sitization campaigns. A large part of the popula-
tion seems to cooperate with international and 
state-led interventions. When the authors asked 
an official whether it was true that there had been 
Table 1: The Proportion of Health Care Workers Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Germany 
Number of Physicians 
per 100,000 inhabitants
Number of Nursing and Midwifery Personnel 
per 100,000 inhabitants
Liberia 1.4 27.4
Côte d’Ivoire 14.4 48.3
Germany 380.6 1,148.9
Source: WHO, Global Health Observatory Data Repository, online: <http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.A1444> (14 October 
2014); the figures on Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire are from 2008, while those on Germany are from 2011. 
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a first case of an Ebola infection in Toulépleu back 
in October, they received the sobering reply “only 
if the WHO has confirmed it.” 
The Cataclysm of Mistrust and Poverty in 
Liberia
The slow and partial reconstruction efforts that 
have taken place in Liberia over the last decade are 
not particularly surprising considering the coun-
try’s history and the uncoordinated internation-
al input. Another problem is the move from the 
planning stage to the implementation of reforms. 
Expansive governance reforms have been planned 
in various government agencies, most notably the 
Governance Commission. Nonetheless, for exam-
ple a constitutional review committee that has ex-
isted since 2012, and has conducted extensive con-
sultations with representatives of various interest 
groups, has so far failed to come up with a politi-
cally viable constitutional amendment. A detailed 
plan for decentralization has yet to become law as 
the devil remains in the details. These important 
reforms were further put on hold as the Ebola vi-
rus ravaged the country. Senatorial elections were 
postponed several times, eventually taking place 
in December 2014. Despite an extremely low turn-
out, unsurprisingly, of just over 25%, the results 
expressed a clear message to Liberian politicians: 
only two of 12 incumbent senators wishing to be 
re-elected were successful, out of a total of 15 sen-
atorial seats.
Repeatedly, state representatives have failed to 
consistently meet the needs and wishes that cit-
izens have in jobs, education, roads, transport, 
and a good health care system. This explains why 
many people have so little trust in the state and 
its representatives. Trust is based on trustwor-
thiness, which is exactly what is lacking (Hardin 
2002). The way in which people respond to infor-
mation depends on how credible or trustworthy 
the source of the information is regarded to be. 
In an atmosphere of deep mistrust, information 
is quickly doubted or immediately thought of as 
wrong or outright irrelevant. Focus group discus-
sions with Liberian market women, teachers and 
youth conducted at the beginning of 2014 by one 
of the authors, indicated the level of mistrust to-
wards the poorly functioning public institutions 
and representatives of the state. The participants 
were asked if local government officials fulfilled 
their duties. In the respondents’ view, barely for-
ty percent of the officials they knew carried out 
the functions they were expected to. The estimate 
was even lower for the focus groups with youth: 
according to them, only 21 percent of the officials 
actually did what they ought to do.1 In addition, 
participants noted that money had to be paid for 
any kind of service to be rendered and that only 
elites benefited from state services. Coupled with 
the mistrust and fears ever present in a post-war 
society, this lack of publicly accessible services 
leads to further mistrust, giving room for rumors 
in the absence of reliable information.
Many Liberians therefore prefer to turn to per-
sonal contacts they have rather than to state-run 
institutions, particularly when it comes to medi-
cal treatment. A great many rumors have been cir-
culated about abuse and malpractices in hospitals, 
especially during the wars, including the refusal to 
admit people and medical experiments being con-
ducted on patients without their consent. Rumors 
of this kind arise not least due to a lack of proper 
education and widely available information, ex-
acerbated by grueling experiences when trying to 
get help. A host of deadly diseases are rampant in 
Liberia, including Malaria, Tuberculosis and HIV, 
which in combination with the weak health infra-
structure makes mortality rates high. Due to the 
Ebola epidemic the health system collapsed even 
more, the number of deaths from persons with ill-
nesses other than Ebola remains a grey, but as-
sumedly very high figure. Recent reports suggest 
an outbreak of measles is possible due to a stop of 
immunization campaigns. In the opinion of ma-
ny Liberians, the cost of medical treatment is al-
so too high, despite health care being subsidized. 
The relatives of a sick person have to pay a large 
proportion of the costs for treatment themselves, 
such as those for the patient’s meals, transport 
and medicine. This is a main reason why patients 
frequently only get taken to a hospital when it is 
too late to help. The great mistrust people have to-
wards the state’s health care facilities becomes ev-
ident due to the fact that the country’s elites tend 
to seek treatment in hospitals in Ghana, South Af-
rica, Europe, or the U.S., whereas the rest of the 
1 See Zanker (2014). Focus-group interviews were conducted 
in Monrovia (Montserrado County), Gbarnga (Bong County) 
and Ganta (Nimba County) between January and February 
2014 in connection with the research project “Local Arenas of 
Power-Sharing” funded by the German Research Foundation 
(DFG) Priority Programme 1448 “Creativity and Adaptation 
in Africa.”
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population has to make do with the precarious fa-
cilities available locally. 
The first few years of post-war reconstruction 
were characterized by high hopes, but what the 
international media only reported about recently 
has been obvious to Liberians for a long time now, 
most recently expressed in the Senatorial elec-
tions: the government has become inefficient and 
clouded in corruption scandals which is hamper-
ing the country’s development. According to this 
view, the government has failed to understand the 
aggrieved population and their critical situation. 
This becomes particularly clear if one looks at the 
events that took place in West Point.
West Point is a peninsula connected to Monro-
via. Despite its central location, Liberia’s govern-
ments have always neglected West Point. The ar-
ea has the reputation of being a hotspot for crime. 
Violence is commonplace, often directed at wom-
en and girls. There is very little public infrastruc-
ture available, even a steady supply of fresh wa-
ter is lacking and hardly any sanitary facilities ex-
ist in this densely populated part of the city, home 
to between 50,000 and 70,000 residents. Fresh wa-
ter is brought into the area from other parts of 
the capital, being transported on carts pushed by 
young men. The majority of West Point’s residents 
make a living by petty trading or fishing. The on-
ly clinic is run by the Catholic Church. A women’s 
organization has been fighting for a badly needed 
ambulance for the last ten years.2 
Residents from West Point found out through 
street rumors that the state had apparently set up 
a quarantine center for Ebola patients in this part 
of the city in August 2014, moving seventeen sus-
pected cases there from other areas of Monrovia. 
Misanthropy and fear grew into resistance. The 
quarantine ward was eventually attacked and sev-
enteen patients apparently disappeared. As a re-
sult, the government ordered the police and army 
to block off access to the peninsula on August 20, 
and the whole of West Point was put under quar-
antine. In the clashes that followed, shots were 
fired, hitting a sixteen-year-old boy who died as 
a result, because he failed to receive proper med-
ical care. Sealing off the peninsula meant that its 
inhabitants had no way of going about their nor-
2 See Kaufmann (2011a and b). Ethnographic field research was 
conducted in Monrovia between 2009 and 2013 in connection 
with the University of Basel’s research project on “The Work 
of State Imageries,” which was funded by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation (SNSF).
mal daily business to make a living - they were not 
even allowed to go fishing. Access to water, food 
and medical care was no longer possible. 
The lack of trust in the state is one reason 
amongst many, why numerous Liberians hard-
ly paid any attention to the outbreak of Ebola ini-
tially. Things changed by the beginning of August 
2014, when the government declared a national 
state of emergency, a large number of internation-
al organizations left the country and the food sup-
ply became difficult because ships were prevent-
ed from docking. Reliable information was initial-
ly hard to attain, which is why numerous rumors 
were spread. The initially contradictory state-
ments about the situation the government had 
made, worsened this. Many of our informants ac-
knowledged that the large number of rumors that 
had been spread during the war made it difficult 
to believe anything the government pronounced. 
Sensitization Campaigns in Côte d’Ivoire
Over a year into the Ebola epidemic, Côte d’Ivoire 
has not had a single official case of Ebola. This 
is surprising, because the entire western part of 
the country borders Liberia and Guinea, both se-
verely affected by the Ebola virus. Two reasons 
amongst many are the early sensitization cam-
paigns and the strict border controls. Paradoxi-
cally, Côte d’Ivoire’s violent political conflict may 
have actually prepared the country for the task of 
coping with the threat of Ebola. Frequent informa-
tion campaigns during the peace process and in 
preparation for the 2010 elections, set a precedent 
for strong sensitization campaigns. In addition, 
stepped-up border patrols were already in place, 
aimed at preventing attacks from groups of exiled 
Ivoirians living across the border in Liberia.
Campaigns to make people aware of the dan-
gers posed by Ebola were carried out by mixed 
delegations consisting of prefects, employees 
from the health sector and army officers. From the 
end of March to April 2014, delegations traveled 
from village to village near the border, provid-
ing them with necessary information. As in other 
parts of this region of West Africa, practically ev-
ery district of a town and village in Côte d’Ivoire 
is organized in a simple yet effective way that 
makes it easier for information to be circulated: a 
committee is grouped around the head of the vil-
lage consisting of representatives of all the impor-
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tant social groups, including religious communi-
ties, women, youth, immigrant and occupational 
groups. Peace missions that were conducted over 
the last few years also used these networks as a 
way of spreading information, further institution-
alizing the system. 
Moreover, the state, local and internation-
al NGOs, and the village heads themselves have 
made ample use of these communication chan-
nels. If one succeeds in persuading the represen-
tatives of the individual social groups to do what 
one wants them to and wins their trust, then there 
is a relatively good chance of the information be-
ing passed on to the groups in words they can un-
derstand. Trusted people and proven organiza-
tional paths create a sound basis for communica-
tion, which makes it much easier to comprehend 
and implement any preventive steps.3 
Sensitization campaigns were repeated in Au-
gust and September 2014, when the virus was 
spreading fast in neighboring countries. In addi-
tion to this, special observation committees run by 
the sub-prefects have been set up to monitor the 
situation locally. A national consortium that pos-
sesses decision-making powers meets about once 
a fortnight, led by the Prime Minister (and attend-
ed by foreign diplomats and representatives of in-
ternational institutions). Although Ebola no lon-
ger makes the front-page news in Côte d’Ivoire, 
the government and its international partners still 
make efforts at keeping people alert with ongo-
ing sensitization campaigns touring through the 
country and TV spots. 
In the end, however, a lot came down to luck. 
When it became official that Ebola had broken out 
in Guinea in March 2014, the virus had not yet 
spread as far as Côte d’Ivoire. In Liberia and Sier-
ra Leone, in contrast, the first cases were already 
present. Fearing that infected people had already 
entered the country, the Ivorian government re-
acted right away by reaching out to the public and 
to border communities in particular to raise peo-
ple’s awareness. 
3 See Heitz Tokpa (2013). The research was conducted in con-
nection with a project entitled “Regaining Trust in Post-Con-
flict Societies” (University of Basel) and was supported by the 
Swiss National Science Foundation.
Safeguarding Porous Borders?
Between August and October 2014, Côte d’Ivoire 
closed its borders as an attempt to protect itself 
from Ebola. 
 As it is nearly impossible to seal off the porous 
borders of West Africa hermetically, “closing the 
borders” probably just means monitoring them 
more closely. The border with Liberia – marked 
by a river – had already been under strong ar-
my surveillance for the past three years. Since Al-
assane Ouattara became the country’s president in 
2011, Ivorian army outposts near the border have 
been attacked repeatedly. The precarious securi-
ty situation along the Ivorian–Liberian border be-
came the subject of international attention ever 
since seven UN soldiers from Niger were killed 
in June 2012. Due to tightened security, it can be 
assumed that uncontrolled border crossings have 
become relatively rare on this border. Moreover, 
since Ebola broke out, a large number of dugout 
canoes, usually used in border crossings, have ei-
ther been chained up or destroyed by the Ivori-
an Army.
At the height of the Ebola outbreak, between 
August and December 2014, the weekly markets 
along the borders were forbidden owing to the 
threat posed by Ebola. In border towns more than 
elsewhere in the country, people followed the 
government’s advice and ceased to shake hands 
in greeting ceremonies. Local restaurants in which 
game — which has been declared responsible for 
transmitting Ebola — used to be prepared have 
been closed down, and anyone who fails to com-
ply with this regulation can expect penalties. 
By March 2015, people became more relaxed 
in Côte d’Ivoire and today hardly anyone refrains 
from shaking hands. This ‘Ebola fatigue’ is seen 
as constituting a new risk, according to experts. 
Therefore NGOs such as Act for Change (ACTED) 
or the International Rescue Committee (IRC) have 
started a new round of sensitization campaigns.
Quo Vadis?
The Ebola outbreak in Liberia happened at a time 
when the health care system was in tatters and re-
liance in state structures and representatives was 
the exception to the rule. Decades of discrimina-
tion and isolation as well as fourteen years of un-
rest and civil war have given many Liberians the 
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impression that their concerns and basic needs are 
not a priority, even in the view of their own state.
Whilst the political elite has also greatly dis-
appointed the citizens of Côte d’Ivoire in the last 
two decades, it still succeeded in maintaining a 
certain standard of service and provision of pub-
lic goods. Well-tested communication networks 
have worked to the benefit of the state and proved 
their effectiveness and usefulness. Nevertheless, 
the fact that bad state-societal relations helped to 
spread the Ebola virus in neighboring countries 
should be taken seriously. The state still has a lot 
to deliver – and is expected to do so – especially in 
the long neglected north of the country.
It will take time to learn from all the mistakes 
that have been made dealing with the Ebola virus. 
For now, the worst may be over, at least in Liberia. 
Just recently, however, a new case was recorded 
after three weeks without a single new infection 
of Ebola. Relief must not turn into negligence. The 
West African outbreak of Ebola has been argued 
to be symbolic of the failure of international aid 
(MSF 2015). This no doubt plays a role, not least 
confirmed by inconsistent reform efforts made by 
the international community in the last decade. 
The comparison between the situations in Liberia 
and Côte d’Ivoire demonstrates that foreign finan-
cial aid alone will not solve the underlying struc-
tural and social problems that enabled the rapid 
spread of Ebola in Liberia. 
The Liberian government, along with interna-
tional partners and community networks, eventu-
ally established a strong anti-Ebola campaign that 
included intense and successful communication 
campaigns with local communities to quell ru-
mors and mistrust by explaining the sickness and 
why it required change in practices such as greet-
ings and burial methods in this period of national 
emergency. This momentum must be maintained. 
Building on communication networks, and fur-
ther strengthening them, will help to address the 
levels of mistrust toward the state, and advance 
the implementation of badly-needed reforms be-
yond the security sector, not least in health care 
provision. 
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